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In the Supreme Court
of the Scite of U tab
AETNA LOAN COMPANY, a
rado corporation,

Colo~

.

"j

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
9059.

vs.
FIDELITY DEPOSIT COMPANY OF
MARYLAND, a Maryland corporation~

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent can accept the statement of facts of appella.n t
for the first four and one· half pages but rejects .as mostly argument and not factual all the material from the middle of page S
to page 10 of its Btief.
Where there is no controversy as to the statement of fact
as taken from the af£ idavit of appellant and as taken from the
3
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affidavit of respondent no pro~lem is pres en ted. But the Distri~ Court denied the motion for summ.ary judgment ufor the
reason that there exist substantial issues o£ £act between the
parties.~t

(R4 32.)

It is the position of respondent that when the appellant
takes an interlocutory appea 1 from denial of motion for sum~
mary judgment upon the ground that substantial issues of fact
exist the appellant is before the Supreme Court admitting that
the facts as contended for by the respandent and · every fair
intendment therefrom are true. Abdulkadi, v. Western Pat. R.
Co. 1 7 ·u 2nd 53t 56, 318 P. 2nd 339. This Court cannot at this
stage ·of the proceedings resolve issues of fact which the Dis~
tr ict Court refused to do; and the allegations of the compl~t
together with the allegations of the answering affidavit of the
plaintiff and every inference and intendment therefrom will be
taken as true on this interlocutory appeal.
There is still a good reason for the interlocutory appeal,
and it was for this good reason that the respondent did not
oppose the · appl icatioo-. In other words, the respondent tee·
ognizes that there is a question of law p.resen ted by the facts
of this case~ the resolving of which will be helpful in the
further handling of the case~
Respondent admits that the blanket bond was written
effective March 7, _195 6, (R~ 7) and that at that time Harold
Knowles was not in its employ. Respondent admits that a list
of employes was furnished and that this list was subsequentlY
amended to include the name of Harold Knowles, although
the document containing his name is not in evidence. Respondent denies th.a t the furnishing of the name of Harold Knowles
4
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or of any of the other persons was gratuitous on the part .of
respondent, was unsolicited. by. appellant; ·or was a· meaningless
gesture in the contractual relations of the parties.. · ·
...~.. ·
.

.

..

Respondent admits that the letter terminating the covet·
age as to Harold Knowles was received shortly after July. ~.'
19 56, ( R. 12) and· that sect ion 12 of the bond is· ir) pat~ quoted
by the appellant at page· 3 of its brief.
·
These admitted facts raise the· folio~ in$' ques tipns. of la~:
.

.

1. Has the con duct of the parties creat<;d an .agreement

for the return of Harold Knowles'
coverage?
.
.
.
.
,

2. Has the conduct of appellant · been s~ch th~ t it is

estopped to deny respondent coverage for Harold Kriow les?
If these are the questions pre sen ted to· this court~ then
the allegations of the complaint and of the affidavit
David
A. Robins on must be examined to determine what facts are
taken as true on this interlocutory appeal and what infe.t:ences
may be drawn therefrom.

of

The complaint alleges that the (bond was in full force and
t

-effectj!l and that Harold Knowles was ··one of the ·employes
covered by the bond~ and that he made a fniudulent cooversion. ( R. 1+) It must also be taken as true that Haroid
Knowles was deleted from coverage on July 2~ · 1956, and
respondent will ultimately have to show that Knowles was
covered despite this cancellation. The facts showing return
to cover age must be found in the affidavit and doc~ents
£led in the action and now. before the court, and particularly
in the affidavit of David A~ Robinson filed for respondent ..
I:O

s
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It will be noted that there is no section o£ the bond (R. 6)
which deals with return to coverage during the period the

bond is in effect as to an employe cancelled out under paragraph
12. This affidavit of Mr. Robinson ··takes issue with certain

statements of fact contained in. , the affidavit of Ronald D.

McGregor. ( R. 1 7.) Consequently there is no admission o!
prior conduct of Harold Knowles justifying the cancellation
and pa.rticularly of know ledge thereof by r_esponden t, there is
no admission that retaining Knowles in the employ of plaintiff
was na failure to heed the purported letter of cancetiation'~;

that the bond wa.s written on any except an annual premium
basis and ran from year to year, and the afl idavit alleges that
there were requirements of new lists for the bond in issue a~

well as another similar bond between the parties, .and that. the
list of names of employes was supplied at the specific request
of appellant's agent. (R. 1 7 and 18. ) Agents of the parties
in May and June, I 9 57 t diScussed '~the need for app~ation~
and further information concerning this bond~B and th-e letter,
Exhibit B" (R. 22) was part of these communications . Exhibits
C and D were specific requests fot applica tioos for individual

coverage on bond No. ~3 61 367. The affidavit alleges that m
response to all of these 1etters and requests Exhibit ~ ~Et ~ was
I orwarded to the Company under this bond which specifically
lis ted Harold Knowles as a covered employe under date ~£
July 18, 1957, and Exhibit "'F" (R . 26) relating to bond
53 61 36 7 was also sent in respons-e to these letters and ~equests+
(R. 19~)
Exhjbit UG" (R. 27) is also attached to the affidavit as
evidence ~~that Harold James Knowles and other persons were

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accepted on q~elity bonqn Of?. June 7~ 1_~57.- ~-~ is true ,th~..t the
reply aff idavi:t of Ronald .:MeGreg.qr takes· ·iss u.~ .. "\\~"j~ this
statement as to the type ~f.= bonds. _.r~f~rr_ed to o_.q. ·. ~i~~t: ~ ~.q- .,
but tespondent.su_bmi~s that the evidenc_e b~fore t~is: co~rt is that

Exhibit ~ GJ' refers to other f jd;eli~y :.bqnds and._. such._ .. is ~the
posltion of respondent. McGregor~~ r_cply ~ffidavit. refe~s_to this
bond as protecting aga~n~t · fraud .-and f_r~udl;llent _repre~e~ta~
tions.' ~ ( R+ 31.) A. further. evidence that .indiyid~ appl~cation
was solicited and required ~s .found in .Exhibi~ .~ .1-~: ·. an·q_. ·~I''
attached to .the a£fidavi t, ~hi bit ~ ~ H ': re~ err iO g to char:tge~ .a.s
well as applications under ·bond No. 53 61 36710. ·.. ·.-· .·.
t

41

The affidavit of .David .A+· Robinson then ·alfeges that
following the reporting ri"f Harold Jarrt~s· ·Krio~les to th'~
defendant ~tat no time thereafter did defendant notify plaintiff
that the said Harold James ·Knowles was n?t a covered employe,
or deny that he wa·s an acceptable employe, as evidenced by
Exhibit ~~Gn~ or· deny. that he had been reinstated~'~ (R. 20.)
•

•

•

~

;• •

••

".:I

The ~ida Vi t clOSeS \V l th the Sta ~eiDtn t that t~e CO~! res pongence ,a_nd oral com1n unication betv•leen ·the part.ies ·~ in.dicated

that defendant kept a file 0 r some .0 ther close .-~heck :On'. e1riployes who were covered by b~nds ~ ~ ~ and that the_ pi~i~ t1 [f
relied on the practice est~blished by· the i~~rties for .lts ·.·b~ll~f
.. that said_ Harold_ James Kno,vles v.-~as. a cov~~ed:empi~'y~ on and
after July 18~ i957. (R. 20.)
.

ARGUMENT

I. HAS THE CONDUCT OF THE .PARTIES CREAT-

ED AN AGREEMENT FOR THE RETURN OF HAROLD
KNOWLES. COVERAGE?
·. 7
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The conduct of the parties has created an agreement on
both of two theories of the facts: Fitst, the conversations
between the agents of appellant and the offkers of respondent
amounted to a request for confinnatiof;l of coverage under the
bond, or in effect an ·offer to give co-verage to persons now m
employment,. which was made de.fi.nite) or accepted, by the
furnishing of the list of employes which included Harold
Know1es (Exhibit '' E~'' R. 2 5) ; and .second, the conversations
and correspondence between the parties caused respondent
to submit a list of employes as an oHer to establish the coverage
of the existing bond, which offer was accepted by the acqui~
escence of appellant and by its failure to object to any of the
names or to deny coverage as to any of the listed employes.
The case Lechler vs. Montana Life Insurance Company1
48 N . D. 644, 186 N.W. 271, 23 A~L.R. 1193 was an action
upon a life insurance policy which had lapsed for nonpayment
of. the second premium. Agents of the company had so]icited
reinstatement of the policy and obtained the signature of the
·policyholder to a reinstatement application. The policyholder
gave the agents ·of the company a note in payment of the
premium for reinstatement of the policy~ Within five weeks
the company had returned the promissory note to the soliciting
agent stating that it could not be received in payment of the
premium. Six weeks later the policyholder died without ever
having· been notified by the agent that his note bad not been
accepted by the company. The court held that the insurer was
under a duty to return the note and communicate the rejection
of the application at the petil of being held to the consequences
of an assent to the reinstatement.. The court noted that where
the relations between parties are such that an offeror reason·

8
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j

ably expects a reply~ or where the offeree is under. ·duty to
notify the offeror that his .proposal is rejected, the failure · to
communicate·. the .rej ectiori rna y .result ·.in. legal·. assent to the·
terms of the offer. ·The Notth Dakota Supreme· Court. said~
...

~·To

•

',

I

;;:

'

•

•

••

":"

:;-,

•

•

the coritention·tliat the lapsed contract could

not be ·revived···witbout etiterin·g into a new·. ·contract
completed by an offer· and an acceptapce~ it need· .0nly
be stated that there is no p~ciple -of ~w: pecuJ.iarly
app licab Ie to insurance cop.tr act~. which necess~ta te~ .an
actual communication· of an acceptance in. every instance. There is a well~defined rUle of law) applicable
to insurance contracts as well as contracts in ·general~
that where the relations between parties have. b.~~ ~uc_h

justify the offeror in

exp~cqng

a replyJ OI _'\\(here
the offeree has come under some duty to commUnicate

35 tO

either a rejection or acceptance~ his failure to communicate his rejection or to perform this 41:1 ty rna y result in~a
legal assent to the terms of the . off ~r. See Wi ll~s~on
Contr.", Section 91. Within this principle we think ·th~re
was a duty to return the note and· communicate the
rejection in the instant case ·at the· peril of. being ·held
to the consequences of an asse~t .to the reins_tatem~t . ''
1n his treatise on con tracts Professor Williston discusses

when silence and inaction may amount to· an ·assent.to· an offer..
Vol. I, Section 91, page 279. He points out that there is an
extension of .this doctrine of silence amounting to an acceptance
developing in the cases where an off etee solicits the -offer. Id.
page 288+ Professor Williston notes that because of the relationship of the parties or. other surrounding circumstance~· the
offeror may be justified a.S. a rea.sonable . man in interpreting
the offeree's silence after receiving the -offer as an acceptance.
He ·also points out that this extension has· been wi_dely applied
to the insurance field where applications for insurance solicited
"9
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-.;\~ere follo~v~d

.by· :unreasonable delay in getting.

notice of

rejection. I d. page 2 88 He c~tes the .fallowing cases as a ~tho rity
for this· propo$iti9n:. Witten t/S~ Beacon Life Assn., 225. Mo.
i\.pp. 3~ 7, 33 S~W. (2d) 989; Lechler VJ~ Montana Life ins, Co.~
{supra);·
Thptnpson
vs~
Posta~. Life Ins. Co.J 226 N~Y. 363~
. . . ..
.
.
123 N .E. 7)0 .( r.~nstatement); Stanton vs~ Eq!fitable Life As~
J(Jrance Soc,~ .137 S.C. 396~ .135 S~E. 367; Kukuska t·'J, flome
Mutu_~! }Jail-Tornado Ins. Co.} 204 Wis. 166~ 235 N .. W. 403~
+

:A case holdl?g that wh_ere there is a contract of ~surance,
a memorandum from the insurer proposing changes will be
~r_e~ted ·as-~ offer which may be accepted or ~eject~d by the
i~sured is Shakman v.r. United States Credit System~ 92 Wis.
366, 66 N.w.· 5~8, 3~ L.R~A. 383, 5.3 Am. St Rep._ 920.
·. /:·· 1~he position of respondent may be restated as follows: .
A tidelity bond had been entered into in 1956 on employes as
they existed in .March; a further list of employes was fur:nished
on which was Harold James Knowles, as a result of \Vhich.list
the coverage v.,· as cancelled as to Knowles because the investi~

( R. 12) ~ in 19 57 further identifi.
.cation of employes w.as discusseQ and requested by the appel·
1ant and. a further up- to.date list was sent (Ex hi bit ~ 'E,)' R. 2 5)
upon whic:h Knowles was again listed; in the meantime Knowles
. had been accepted on a bond .involving fraud and fraudulent
representation· coverage (Exhibit '~G, ') R. 27) ~ all of which
had given respondent the impression that· employes now sublnitted would be covered, unless subsequently rejected, and that
Knowles ·was now available for coverage. It must be remem ·
b er e.d~ that the 1etter of cancellation as to Know1es did not· state
that he· w a.s guilty of any fra. ud, dishonesty~ or embezzlement, '•
ga ti-on

~vas not 'sa tis factory''
t

10
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to him nha.s not been satisR. 13.) With this background respondent could not

but only that the investigation

factory. I~

(

a5

know whether it was giving coverage to the employes listed on
Exhibit ~E, ~j in response to an offer £:rom the a.ppellantt or
4

whether the appellant was requesting further information to

give coverage to new employes which coverage would
unless there should be a rejection. Since this is

res~lt

ablanket position

bond~ the

most reasonable a.ss urn ption is that coverage was
being given to all of the ~ployes to be submitted on. a new
list, with the company reserving the tight to investigate and
reject any such employes and terminate their coverage. Since
Knowles was submitted after. the bond
took effect and his
name
.
.
was rejected in 19 56, there was no reason to assume that the
company would do other than check Knowles~ name aga.in
and accept the coverage if the ear tier unsa tis factory investigation
was now satisfactory and presumably this would follow from
the specific clearance of Knowles on the ~~fraud and fraudulent
misrepresentation bond~ I· (Exhibit ~ ~ G R~ .2 7~)
t ''

II+

HAS THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT BEEN

SUCH THAT IT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY RESPONDENT
COVERAGE FOR HAROLD KNOWLES?
Respondent contends that two distinct factors~ when considered together ~stop the appellant from denying that Mr.
Harold Knowles was coyered by their fidelity bond. These
t

factors are: (1) Appellants issuiog a subsequent. bond and
covering Ha.told Knowles for fraud and fraudulent misrepresentations, the correspondence a.nd solicitations of the agent
of tbe appellant indicating to respondent that Harold Knowles
11
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either v,.Tas ·or could be reinstated a.s a covered employe· under
this particular _bond; and ( 2) The appellant's remaining sil ~nt
·after the· submission· to it· of the list of employes containing
Harold Knowles' name a.nd taking no action to inform respond..
ent that _Harold KnoVtrles was not covered by the bond ..

.··.·_:::>·~···An estoppel ~ay atiSe from. silence
.

.

01

inaction.· 19 Am.

Jur., Estoppel_~ Section 55, page ?61~ In the case of Carlson vs.
Smith, 2l3 Iowa 231, 236 NrW~ 387, 80 ArLrR. 186, the Io·wa
Supreme Court held that one who stands by with knowledge
of the understari~ing of another with respect to a proposed
tra..nsaction between them and ren:iains silent, will not be permitted to maintain that silence constituted a denial of the understanding as to what the agreement was.
Responden_t does not contend that jt was silence alone
. .
.
which estops appellant from denying coverage. It was remainir;tg silent after ~nvi ting new lists of covered etnployes v.,T hich ..
forms the basis for an estoppeL .
In a recent case the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Grcuit, held an insur a.nce company bound upon a surety bond
for performance of a construction con tract. T'fin ity Universal
Insurance Co. vs . Gould, 258 F. 2d 883. Mr. Gould w.as attempting to enforce the penalty on the surety bond for the performance of a ·contract between himself and a contractor fot the
construction of G·ould's dwelling. As a defense the fidelity
company asserted a material al teratibn· of the c~~ truction
contra~t which worked a breach and discharge of its obligation.
The court acknowledged this defense and held that any modi~
fica tion of the construction contract which material Iy increases
a stlrety~s risk discharges the surety;>s obligation~ The Cowt
12
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of Appeals found that the surety was under no duty to declare
a breach of the bond even though they bad knowledge of the
material alterations of the construction contract. However~ the

court l)eld the surety liable und:er the bo~d because of conduct
\va i\· ing a right to insist upon the breach of the bond.
The court noted that during the course of construction
Gould had inform~d the fidelity . coinpan y~ s. manager .of the
developments in connection with. the building contract. On this

point the court said:
~·But~

a.s

·
a. compensated surety, T rin icy

owed its

patron the duty o~ good faith which ascends t~_e morals
of the market place-a duty not to deceive or mislead.
Any course of actiori with knowledge of the · breath
which can be reasonably constru~d to indicate a diSposition to continue the suretyship rel-ation woFks a
waiver of the breach . fack vJ . Craighead Rice Milling
Co. 1 8 Cir~~ 167 F. 2d 96; Sormanti vs. Deacutis1 79 RJ.
361, 89 A~ 2d 191; Spring Garden Building & Loan
Assns. vs. Rhodes1 126 Pa. Super. 102~ 190 A. 530.

In this type of case the principles of contract and estoppel
overlap and it is not easy to isolate them. In addition to the
facts relied upon as supporting agreement there is the fact that
respondent ·~~relied on~ the practice of the parties as g1v1ng
coverage far Knowles. ( R. 20.)
t

The background of this reliance) and the facts reasonably
to be in1 erred from this reliance are as £ollows:
After the bond was first written in March 1956, Knowles
was added on a supplemental list, appellant scrutinized the
listj made some investigation, and cancelled as to Knowles,

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

without giving any factual basis. Respondent retained J<nowles
as a satisfactory employe~ He was cleared and covered in June
195 7, on a fraud bond issued by appellant. (R . 2 7.) Appellanfs
agent requested an up-to-date list_. (R·. 19) 20.) Why? Presumably tq ma·ke certain .of coverage and to give ap~llant .a. chance
t£? investigate thcn1 ~ as they had previous! y done with Knowles.
Respondent reasonably relied on this ptactke and the clearance
in Exhibit ~~G'' for believing and .assuming. that Knowles was
covered until stricken. His year of satisfactory service would
be added to the previous investigation and the clearance under
Exhibit .''G/' and he would probably be approved.
Appellant~

had it martialed its facts, would have known
.this. It chose to say nothing and might have concluded that
Knowles ~as now a good risk. By its silence~ when respondent
re1i ed on coverage., an estoppel is. operative and the trial court
should weigh the nature and reasonableness of respondent' .s

reliance.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The trial court found substantial issues of fact to exist
in this case and denied the motion for summary judgment.
On this appeal the allegations of fact in the complaint and
in the Robinson affidavit are taken as true, together with
reasonable intendrrrents and inferences to be drawn therefro~.
A ppellanfs aff ida vi t stands only as to matters not in conflict
under this ruleL ·

Respondent by the pleadings and affidavit has informed
the court tb at it can prove: that the original bond did not include

14
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·i

Knowles; that the premium was to be paid annually; that

Kno"· les · name was submitted on a supplemental list and
coverage as to him was cancelled by letter of July 2~ 195 6; in

May and June 19 S7~ appellant's agents requested lists of employes for this bond and for another .similar bond for related
companies; in June 1957 Harold Knowles was bonded by
appe11 ant against ''fraud and fraudulent representation~:>; in
July 195 7 a current list of employes was submitted to appellant
in .accordance with requests and Harold Knowles was .an included employe; Harold Knowle5 had been in respondenfs

employ for more than a year and was a satisfactory employe;
and after sending in Knowles name respondent relied on the
1

practice which had developed and the request for submission
of names as giving coverage.
·

Upon these facts the authorities uphold coverage on a
theory of contract and also based upon estoppel or upon a
combination of the two. The trier of facts might alter the facts
as recited; but if respondent can establish those facts we submit that a case of liability will be made out.
WHEREFORE, respondent submits that the ruling of the
District Court should be affirmed~

RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART
and LON RODNEY KUMP

Attot'neys for Respondent
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake .City~ Utah
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